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ABSTRACT

The legitimate use of authority in political and moral education is examined from a cognitive-developmental perspective. However, legitimate authoritative communications by a teacher must have the potential for reasoned elaboration. These communications then mark off the boundaries of rational and authoritative communication from non- and irrational communications. The backing by reasons of these authoritative statements must be made apparent at some level meaningful to the child if genuine authority is to be established, even if the child is not capable of fully comprehending the concepts and relations involved. In Kohlberg's three stages of moral development, authority can be used to mark out and develop the sphere of reason up until the child reaches the postconventional, autonomous, or principled level. In the political education of young children, authority can be used to make clear to children that political party allegiances and strong positive feelings about the Presidency are not genetically inherited from parents but are choices made from rational political thought. (Author/DE)

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AUTHORITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

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I. Introduction

Authority has often been seen as directly opposed to the use of reason. Complying unthinkingly with an authoritative command, or believing the truth of a pronouncement merely because it was enunciated by someone claiming to be an authority, are often taken as paradigm cases for the use of the term "authority". Against these examples are set the ideals of an antonomous person, a self-legislating seeker of truth. When authority is thus set over against freedom and reason, the choices for those who value freedom and rationality seem to be narrowed to either an acceptance of authority (often accompanied by a nagging sense of betrayal), or an anarchist position rejecting the claims of authority entirely.[1] This dilemma would appear to apply all the more so in education, where the development of rational, autonomous individuals seems bound up in the very idea of an educated person.[2] Most of us are left with frequent feelings of ambivalence about authority in education.

It is part of the purpose of this paper to show how authority rightfully occupies an important place in education. And, to push the point further, it may be argued with some justification that educative activities may be seen as a limiting case in the use of authority. By this I mean that if authority could be justified nowhere else in social life - if we lived in the perfect society of our dreams - a good case could yet be made for authority in education. Instead of getting bogged down in debates which lead to the dead end choice of either challenging or accepting all uses of authority, we hope to steer the debate toward its proper place in sorting out false authority from genuine authority.

And authority in education is to be judged genuine to the extent that it contributes to the aims of education itself - not the aims of the business or political worlds beyond the school.

This case will be made in the context of a discussion of the "cognitive-developmental" approach to the development of political orientations. If we were to sketch in broadest strokes the major controversies in the study of child socialization and development, prominent among them would be the issue of whether the process is best characterized in terms suggesting molding and shaping or in terms picking out the role of the initiative and activity of the child.[3] The import for the teacher is obvious, pervasive, and a constant point of contention among educationist: should education be a drawing out or a shaping process? Often (if not always), these differences are overdrawn in the process of contending for favorable lines of battle in the academic or policy arenas. I do not want to suggest that real differences in perspective do not exist, but only that much of importance to each perspective can be lost by overzealous contruction of straw men. Such a loss seems to have occured within the developmental perspective, which views socialization and education as a process of mediating the childs' natural activity with his environment. Having been constantly pressed to battle in the name of opposition to an "authoritarian" traditionalism, progressive developmentalists seem to be constantly plagued with the question of authority.

There are two aspects of the general problem of authority and political education which could be dealt with. Both aspects follow from a reconsideration of Aristotle's conclusion that politics is not a proper study for youth, for they lack the experience required for a full understanding of political life.

The first problem relates to whether and how authority can be used in political education before the child is able to grasp the underlying structure of the political world. A different aspect of the problem of authority and political education would involve us in questions about the extent to which the experiences of the child with authority in the total framework of the school can be considered an experiential groundwork for the ability to understand political authority. The first question is about the educative effects of the use of authority, while the second deals with the political effects. I will deal here only with the first problem. I begin with a clarification of the conception of authority used here. The cognitive-developmental perspective and its implications for moral education are then introduced. And I conclude with a discussion of some uses of authority in political education.

The Concept of Authority - Some Central Aspects

Situations involving authority are part of the general category of social influence situations. In these situations some attempt is made to influence or control the behavior or beliefs of others. In situations involving social control we speak of a person being in authority. A teacher is in authority in the classroom in maintaining a context of social relations conducive to learning. A teacher is also, to some extent, an authority on some subject matter which she hopes to teach.

Authority is sometimes viewed as a species of power, but recent philosophical analysis has shown good reasons for distinguishing authority from power. As Richard Peters puts the case:

> Often what we want to bring out when we say that men are in authority or exert authority over other men is that they get their way or ought to get their way by means other than those of force, threats, incentives and propaganda, which are the usual ways of exercising power. It is only when a system of authority breaks down or a given individual loses his authority that there must be a recourse to power if conformity is to be ensured.[4]

We are not concerned, then, with situations in which force or other forms of coercion are involved. Power is surely an important aspect of our educational systems. From compulsory attendance and the administration or threat of punishments to the governance of school systems students are regularly affected by uses of power. But we need to stake out somewhat different territory for our discussion of authority.

Authority is also to be distinguished from rational persuasion. In situations involving rational persuasion one attempts to give compelling reasons for taking a course of action or believing something. It is left entirely to the other person to weigh and accept or reject those reasons. When a communication is said to be authoritative, however, we are noting that the matter is not being left entirely to the other person.

making decisions and requests, and in issuing pronouncements and commands, we are asserting that the matter cannot be left to a process of persuasion, to the individual's ability to comprehend or willingness to accept our reasons.

Are we to understand from this last statement that the teacher's authority role places him/her in opposition to the development of the reasoning capacities of the students? This, I believe, is frequently the conclusion tacitly arrived at by many. When we close off rational persuasion we surely are moving from the teaching to the "policeman" role. The use of authority may shape character - or stunt its development. But how could it be educative in the sense of contributing to the development of children's rational capacities? So it seems too many. But I have claimed that we can indeed look at the role of authority in educative activities. And I believe this claim can be vindicated if we look seriously at the proposition, developed by Carl Friedrich, that "authority and reason are closely linked, indeed that authority rests on the ability to issue communications which are capable of reasoned elaboration."[5] Friedrich's view of authoriative communications is capsulized in the following passage.

> Such communications, whethe. opinions or commands, are not demonstrated through rational discourse, but they possess the potentiality of reasoned elaboration - they are "worthy of acceptance". Seen in this perspective, authority is a quality of communication, rather than of persons, and when we speak of the authority of a person, we are using a shorthand expression to indicate that he possesses the capacity of issue authoriative communications.[6]

The first important point to be made about a teacher's authority, then, is that she communicates requests, decision etc., that are capable of being backed by good reasons. One educational philosopher makes a relevant distinction between status oriented and task or situation oriented requests and decisions.[7] Those which are based on whim or the personal needs of a teacher are not too easily masked and presented as the judgments of a genuine authority. And it is this need for masking, for pretention that the situation or task requires it, which reveals the rational basis of genuine authority.

teacher's authoritative communications will, of course, be challenged from time to time; and this is the acid test in establishing and preserving authority. For the teacher must be able to elaborate and give relevant reasons for the action - even if she/he is not willing to let the results rest on rational persuasion.

The second important (perhaps critical for my argument) feature of authoritative communications emerges by looking at this same point from a different perspective. Far from standing in direct opposition to the development of reason, communications having the genuine potentiality for reasoned elaboration can be seen to function also as marking off the boundaries of rational and authoritative communication from non and irrational communications. It is, basically, part of the process of teaching what those boundaries are.

Let me elaborate on this most important point. A child may be explicitly or implicity asked to do or believe things for which good reasons cannot in fact be supplied. The range of these cases extends from matters of faith to matters of pure convenience or personal gratification. By dealing with the child in a way that intimates whether the required action or belief is backed by good reasons, the range of rationality - and thus also of authority is established. This range is thus distinguished from the non-rational and irrational demands that might be placed on a child.

The range of reason and authority, I want to argue, is crucially important to the educational process. We must attend to this core aspect in order to understand the role of authority in the development of rational beliefs. It is true, of course, that many questions of authority in an educational context arise when authority is said to close off the development of rationality - as in the case of indoctrination. But it is not genuine authority that be being challenged. It is rather a pretentious or false authority - one which demands the prerogatives of authority without standing on the firm ground of cogent reasoning.

A final point to be made about authority involves the relationship between the reasonings which an authority is capable of producing to back a decision or command, and the reasonings which a child is capable of comprehending. Friedrich asserts that "when we say x possesses authority, we thereby propose to suggest that the communications which x addresses to a, b, and c, are based upon reasoning that has meaning not only to x, but also to a, b, and c, in the sense of being related to knowledge which they all possess, or to opinions, beliefs and values which they all share".[8] But what sort of meaning must an authoritative communication have for children in educative activities?

We can understand the particular need for authority in education that I am concerned with if we look at the difference between teaching and indoctrination. A teacher attempts not only to communicate knowledge, but also to engage the child's understanding by participation in the underlying reasoning processes. Indoctrination involves inculcating beliefs in such a way that understanding is discouraged. (For example, an appeal to authority as a backing for a belief is indoctrination - precisely because authoritative communications themselves require backing by relevant reasonings). A dilemma confronts the teacher, however, when a child's mental development has not proceeded to a stage where the underlying reasonings can be understood. In the moral sphere, for example, young children cannot understand the principles which provide good reasons for not lying, cheating, or stealing.[9] It is with situations such as these that a good case can be made for instruction (rather than true teaching) and the use of authority. Thus, the third point to be made about authority is that the reasoning which supports an authoritative communication must be explicable, as far as is possible, at a level which is available to the mental capacities of the child. But, barring full comprehension by the child, the capacity to enlarge upon and back the communication by reasons should be made apparent.

When an authority directs a child not to cheat, for example, and is challenged to supply reasons, responses such as "because I said not to", or even "because it is wrong" will not do. The child must be made aware that there are good reasons for judging cheating to be wrong, even if all the reasonings are not fully comprehensible to her.

We have been trying to get at an aspect of the notion of authority which is brought out with particular emphasis in educational activities. The three major points can now be summarized before we move on to discuss examples from the realms of moral and political education.

1) Authoritative communications have the potential for reasoned elaboration
2) We can see genuinely authoritative communications as one sort of procedure (we are certainly not claiming it is the only or even the most important one) by which the range of beliefs and actions which have rational backing are marked off from those which do not.
3) The backing by reasons must be made apparent at some level meaningful to the child if genuine authority is to be established; even if the child is not capable of fully comprehending the concepts and relations involved.

There are certainly many other important aspects of authority which merit treatment in a full discussion of authority in education. I have tried to begin to focus attention on one aspect of authority which may be of importance in resolving some of the ambivalence felt by many educators when authority is discussed. We have not touched on the problems of legitimate and illegitimate authority, or the complex relations between power and authority; and only inpassing have we mentioned the problem of false authority. It is hoped, however, that the conceptual groundwork is laid for insight into one aspect of the importance of cognitive-developmental psychology in education.

Authority and Cognitive-Developmental Psychology

The research of cognitive-developmental psychologists is organized and informed by the view that mental development can best be comprehended as a qualitative transformation of cognitive structures in an invariant and cutturally, universal sequence.[10] In brief, this theory asserts that children pass through three general levels of reasoning as they move toward mental maturity. Each level involves characteristic kinds of reasons which are available to and understood by the child, and these are dependent on the general characteristics of thinking at that level.

The movement from one level to another depends on the interaction between the active structuring of his experience by the child and the kinds of situations he confronts and deals with. By way of illustration, we can look at the way in which levels of moral development are described by Laurence Koblberg.

The first level distinguished by Kohlberg is termed preconventional.

> At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels.[11]

At this preconventional level authoritative communications tend to be superceded by uses of power - for example, punishment, reward of manipulation (keeping the child away from temptation). Insofar as authority is possible it is tied to the adult's worldly wisdom. When Johnny tries to hit his playmate to get a toy an order not to hit could be backed by the assertion that the enjoyment of companionship in play would be impossible if hitting were allowed. More complete explanations of moral rules are surely important in helping the child to move to the next moral level.

But it is impossible always to engage in persuasive discussions. And authoritative communication in this case can remind and reinforce the idea that there are good reasons for finding non-violent means for setting disputes - that the urge to aggress is subject to the discipline of reasonableness implied in the use of authority. (Would simple punishment convey the same implication as the demand "You must agree on who gets the toy without hitting"?)

Kohlberg designates the second general level of moral development the conventional level.

> At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it.[12]

It is at this level that the use of authority becomes most important. There is a constant tension between the child's increasing susceptibility to uses of authority and the need to prepare him to think things through for himself beyond the particular social demands that are placed on him. The increasing susceptibility to uses of authority derives from a new interpretative framework or structure of moral thought in which moral committments are interpreted in terms of the expectations conveyed in different social orders. The introduction of the authority of a teacher helps him to gain perspective on the social order of the family and peers. But the child's awareness of even broader social and political demands is growing. Uses of parental and teacher authority must complement the attempt to convey to the child and develop in him a sense of his own responsibility for assessing all these demands. He may not yet be capable of thinking in terms of moral principles, and the development of moral reasoning would be sidetracked or even fixated if the process of authoritative communication were misused by asserting an (irrational)claim to absolute precedence of any particular set of demands.

But authority is properly used, I want to argue, if it is used to counteract, or challenge children to move beyond their characteristically rigid interpretation of rules at this level of moral thinking - viewing them as objective and absolute demands with a natural and absolute order of precedence. Such a use of authority may be seen as opening up or promoting the course of development.

Authoritative communications must always be explicable in terms which intimate the importance of autonomy and individual moral principles. And they should be issued with the idea that the realm of reason (or good moral reasoning) is being marked and not transcended. For example, if a child harrasses another because of the second child's refusal to pledge allegiance to a flag, should not an order to desist be issued? Certainly the moral claim implicit in any such order is related to an attempt to reveal the limits to the state's claims on the individual, and the necessary balancing of parental and governmental expectations.

The most adequate type of moral reasoning is available at what Kohlberg terms the postconventional, autonomous or principled level.

> At this level there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. [13]

This capacity for principles thought may not be achieved during the school years, (or at all, for that matter, but it appears to be within the grasp of many children by mid-adolescence. It is here that problems of authority may become acute. It would appear to lose its developmental rationale as the capacity for autonomy in thought and responsibility in action takes hold. Moral discussion and persuasion can be carried on at that abstract, principled level which is required in reconciling and evaluating the various claims to just and virtuous action pressed on us.

I have tried to use the case of moral development to illustrate the way in which the use of authority can be related to the growth of reason in children. The genuineness of a teacher's authority is enhanced when she/he becomes attuned to the level of reasoning available to children in their thinking. The justifiable place of authority is less easily encroached by the impatient urge to resort immediately to power when persuasion would fail. And authority is less tightly gripped when the possibility of movement toward autonomy presents itself. The justification of authority here is not tied to extrinsic factors which predominate in many discussions - such as the contribution of established authority to security or order. It is rather related directly to the use of authority to complement other means of marking out and developing the sphere of reason. This allows us also to emerge from ambivalence to authority and make clear the good grounds for dispensing with authority when it interferes with the developmental aims of education.

IV. The Development of Political Orientations

During the past decade or so political scientists have begun to develop a research literature on the development of political orientations, generally designated as "political socialization" studies. These researches have not been designed to provide practically useful information to teachers, curriculum developers, etc. But a few tentative implications for political education can be drawn out. And I will try to comment on the role of authority in political education as seen from a developmental perspective.

The first clear question to be raised about the elementary curriculum involves the expanding environment or concentric circles curriculum plan, which requires that the child study the neighborhood first, then the local community, followed in order by the state, the nation and then other nations. Political socialization research has shown, however, that the child's awareness of the political realm does not follow this neat order. The child appears to be introduced to the structure of political authority first through both the policeman (a local figure) and the President (a national figure).[15] The implications of this finding for political education seem most direct for the curriculum developer. But if we look at the way in which children's awareness of the President is shaped, an important question about the role of authority presents itself. But first we must take a close look at this "head and tail" effect.

Gustav Johoda's developmental studies of the acquisition of children's geographical ideas related to country and nationality point clearly to a "dominant, if not universal sequence of conceptual development from the immediate vicinity outwards."[16] How can this be reconciled with the findings of Easton and Dennis about the "head and tail" effect evident in the child's early awareness of President and policeman? The answer appears to lie in the character of the child's early awareness of the President. Fred Greestein has found that most children in the elementary years have a surprisingly positive view of the President, seeing him as a "benevolent leader".

However, "Evaluations and 'affective knowledge' about political leaders seem to precede the factual information on which they might be based."[17] Thus, while a cognitive concept of the President as a national political figure, as part of a "structure of authority", may be beyond the grasp of young children, they do acquire strong positive feelings about "the President".

This at least raises the question of whether we cannot introduce the methods of critical inquiry at an early educational level. Insofar as such inquiry depends upon abstract reflective thought implied in the post-conventional level of cognitive development (Piaget's "formal thought"), success here doesn't seem likely. And the cognitive-developmental framework also helps us to see why children are so susceptible to, perhaps even eager for, normative committments to "authorities". The higher the level of the "authority", the easier it appears to be to resolve the conflicts in rules and norms which are so central to the conventional level of development. But this principle of hierarchy is not an adequate solution to the moral-political problems the child will face. It is here, then, that I believe a good case can be made for instructing children authoriatively in the variability of assessments of political authorities. Studies clearly show that neither the general adult population[18] nor certain segments of the student population[19] have such groundlessly high positive feelings toward the President. (The ratings of the President in the early years even surpass the ratings of their fathers and teachers). Children should be made aware of this variability and told that there are good grounds (which they may not yet understand) for both high and low assessments. The use of authority here may serve rather than hinder the aim of developing political rationality. The same case for authoritative political instruction can be made, I believe, in other areas. For the finding that political evaluations and committments precede knowledge and information appears to apply in many areas.

One major study of political socialization provides empirical support, and a summary conclusion. "Evaluative judgments of political objects in all areas are acquired first. These are supplemented later by acquis'tion of more complex information and attitudes which are usually consistent with these evaluations."[20]

For example, it does not seem too astounding to learn that the children in Greenstein's study "described themselves as Republicans or Democrates before they were able to make any meaningful statements about the parties, or even to link the party labels with the names of conspicuous leaders such as the President and major". A recent developmental study, The Child's Construction of Politics by Robert Connell, may shed some light on this phenomenon.

Connell points out that the first indication of party preference is usually made before the child is capable of making means - end calculations about social groupings.[23] It is necessary for the child to have a view of party choice as open to reasoning before he can see a political party as a means. One of the strongest predictors of party choice has been found to be the party choice of one's family, and particularly the parents.[24] Connell finds three types of cases where family influence enters into the party preference of the child. These cases, I believe, can be laid out according to the degree of success in political socialization to a system of party competition - a requisite of any higher level political rationality in liberal democratic regimes.

The first type of case is "simple correspondence", where a child "mentions a family preference, and gives his own as the same, but does not give family choice as a reason for his own".[25] The interviews show that the child is not making independent calculations on grounds for party preference, but is taking the name of a party from his parents in a rather unthinking manner.

The second type of case points to family loyalty as a basis for party choice. The children may consciously pick the same party to express their solidarity with their parents. We see here the beginning of a type of political thought where it is relevant to give a conventionalist sort of rationale for party preference. In a third group of cases, parental opinion is given as reason for party choice, and thus as a ground for the child's own judgment. Connell's assessment of these cases, with which I tend to agree, is that party preference is adopted on the authority of their parents' opinions. And this is authority in Friedrich's sense of communications which are capable of reasoned elaborations. The point here is that, while the child is not yet capable of connecting parties with policies in a reasoned manner, he is aware that his parents are capable of giving the types of reasons that are relevant to party choice. The next step in the political socialization process would involve the ability to handle for himself the type of discourse that connects reasons for policies with reasons for party choice. The path is open for the third group in a way that it is not (or not yet) open for the children in the first or second group of cases.

Where children are not yet capable of the kind of reasoning relevant to rational party choice. I believe there is a good case for authoritative instruction or intervention in dealing with the character of political party choice and allegiance. This is certainly not to say that teachers should issue authoritative decisions about the best party choice for the child. But a teacher contributing to political education ought to be able to intevene in an authoritative manner when a child views party allegiance much like a genetic inheritance. He may not be capable of handling the appropriate types of reasons, but it should be made clear that party committment is within the realm of the discipline of reason; and the use of authoritative communications may be one way to promote this understanding - to hold open the path to rational political thought.

I have elsewhere elaborated and defended a committment, which I believe many will share, to the full development of reflectively rational political thought as a core achievement of political education.[26] Against this approach are set all those attempts to inculate particular sets of correct beliefs or proper values in the moral and political realm. It is only when we understand a committment to rationality from a developmental perspective, however, that the use of authority falls into its proper place. Without this perspective, opposition to conformist approaches can degenerate into an impotent dependence on a "natural" course of interest and change, or a potentially destructive manipulation children's interests and enthusiasms (a use of power) without marking off a course toward participation in the discipline of reason.

If this developmental view has implications for the use of authority by teachers, it should likewise have implications for the education of teachers. Presuming that teaching and the use of authority are more likely to be conducive to the development of political rationality if teachers try to promote political rationality than if they don't, we can see two very general logical implications for teacher education.[27] First, teachers must be introduced to the concept of political rationality and see that there are different stages or levels in its development. Second, teachers must be shown how they can be effective in its promotion, and how authority can contribute (as well as hinder).

A criterion that has been suggested for the rational use of authority in moral education is "to make itself dispensable through the development of a personal moral integrity based on reason."[28] In political education, authority must likewise be tied to its aim - the development of citizens who are capable of reflecting on and critically appraising established political practices. The use of authority that I have in mind is especially important for those of a critical persuasion - those who would develop the capacities of students to think critically about the fundamental bases of our society.

For the dominent forces of socialization discourage rational reflection on our institutions. Authoritative statements about the appropriateness of submitting our institutions to the scrutiny of reason can be viewed as the most rational and educative course of action. To repeat my argument, the development of a politically educated citizenry may in fact depend on important ways on the establishment and proper use of authority. Even in a society of principled anarchists the realm of reason must be marked off for the young in ways that do not presume an understanding of higher level reasoning. But we are not a society which can claim a politically educated citizenry. The conventional level of thought has been found to be prevalent.[29] We should consider, at the least, whether the paucity of reflective political thinking could not be due partly to the failure to use authority in education with sensitivity and conviction (because we have not seen the connection with the development of political rationality), rather than due soley to a structurally or psychologically authoritarian school system.

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NOTES

1. This later choice seems to be the position of Robert Paul Wolff in his In Defense of Anarchism, and his argument seems to proceed from a dilemma framed in this way.

2. Richard Peters, "Education and the Educated Man", in Education and the Development of Reason, ed. by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).

3. For the terms of this debate in the political socialization literature, see Robert D. Hess, "The Acquisition of Feelings of Political Efficacy in Pre-Adults", and Christian Boy, "Human Development and Political Orientations: Notes Toward a Science of Political Education", both in G. Abcarian and J.W. Soule (eds), Social Psychology and Political Behavior (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 59-78 and 149-182. For a discussion of these terminologies as "perspectives", labeled "conformity" and "developmental", see my Ph.D. dissertation, "Political Socialization and Political Education", Univ. of Massachusetts, 1974.

4. "Authority", in Richard Flathman (ed.), Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 154. Reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 32 (1958).

5. "Authority, Reason and Discretion", in Flathman, (ed.), Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 167-181, at p. 168. Emphasis added.

6. Ibid., p. 172.

7. Richard Peters, Ethics and Education (Glenview, Ill.; Scott, Foresman and Co., (1966), p. 170

8. "Authority, Reason and Discretion", Op. Cit., p. 172.

9. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965. originally published in 1932).

10. For a fuller summary of the cognitive - developmental approach, see J. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963) or H. Ginsburg and S. Opper, Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

11. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development", in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 164.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Cognitive-developmental psychologists have established rough age norms, but these are de-emphasized because age per se is not taken to be a positive factor in explaining development. Maturation sets limits on the developmental process. but it is an interaction between the organism and environment which explains the course of development.

15. David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

16. Gustav Johoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas About Country and Nationality", in C.G. Bell (ed.), Growth and Change: A Reader in Political Socialization (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1973), p. 180. This article originally appeared in The British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 1963), and No. 2 (June, 1963).

17. Fred Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority", in Bell (ed.), Growth and Change, p. 78. This article originally appeared in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 1960).

18. Ibid.

19. Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederick Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture, "The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 2 (June, 1968).

20. Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967) p. 252.

21. "The Benevolent Leader", p. 78.

22. (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1971)

23. Ibid., pp. 65-84.

24. See Angus Campbell, et al, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1964); and M.K. Jennings and R. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values From Parent to Child", The American Political Science Review 63 (March, 1969), pp. 5-25.

25. Connell, The Child's Construction of Politics, p. 67.

26. "Political Socialization and Political Education", Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1974.

27. This list closely parallels that suggested by Gary Cox in his recent paper on moral education, "Moral Intelligence: Performance Criteria".

28. R.F. Dearden, The Philosophy of Primary Education (New York: Humanities Press, 1968)., p. 174.

29. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization", in D. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).